Although the benefits of organic farming are already well known, the conversion to organic farming does not proceed as the Dutch government expected. In order to investigate the conversion decisions of Dutch arable farms, a discrete stochastic dynamic utility-efficient programming (DUEP) model is developed with special attention for yield and price risk of conventional, conversion and organic crops. The model maximizes the expected utility of the farmer depending on the farmer's risk attitude. The DUEP model is an extension of a dynamic linear programming model that maximized the labour income of conversion from conventional to organic farming over a 10 year planning horizon. The DUEP model was used to model a typical farm for the central clay region in the Netherlands. The results show that for a risk-neutral farmer it is optimal to convert to organic farming. However, for a more risk-averse farmer it is only optimal to fully convert if policy incentives are applied such as taxes on pesticides or subsidies on conversion, or if the market for the organic products becomes more stable.
Introduction
Increased consumer awareness of food safety issues and environmental concerns in Europe has contributed to the growth of organic farming over the last few decades. However, the overall significance of organic farming in the European context is still quite small in terms of land area used. In 2002 it represented slightly more than 3 per cent of the total EU utilised agricultural area (Lampkin 2002) . Other major agricultural producers like the US and Australia reached percentages of 0.23 and 2.3 respectively (Yussefi 2003) . In some EU-member states, such as in the Netherlands, the rapid growth in the nineties has slowed down after the end of the century. The desired target of 5 per cent organic area of the utilised agricultural area in 2005, set by the Dutch government in 2000, was not reached. It was only 2.47 per cent (Eurostat 2006) . However, the target of 10 per cent by 2010 still remains (MINLNV 2005) . In order to reach the target, more insight is needed into factors which hamper and stimulate the conversion of farms.
Previous studies showed that organic arable farms can achieve very similar or even higher income levels than comparable conventional farms (Langley et al. 1983; Offermann and Nieberg 2000; Morris et al. 2001; Acs et al. 2007a,b) . These results cannot explain the stagnation of conversion over the last years. An aspect that needs more attention in the models is the variability concerning yields and prices, which poses a risk to farmers. Furthermore, it has been common to assume, often implicitly, that decision makers are indifferent to risk. However, assuming absence of risk aversion seems not suitable as it is well known that risk aversion is widespread (Hardaker et al. 2004) .
Some studies suggest that the main sources of risk for both conventional and organic farmers are output prices and production risks (Martin 1996; Harwood et al. 1999; Meuwissen et al. 2001) . In arable farming in the Netherlands there is a large variation between the years in crops' gross margin of conventional, conversion and organic crops (LEI 2004) . This is mainly caused by large revenue (yield and output price) variation across the years. Differences in variation between conventional, conversion and organic crops are caused mainly by different management practices (i.e. restrictions on pesticide use and fertilizer) and by different market opportunities and prices for the products (Lampkin and Padel 1994) . This suggests that it is important to take into account the variation of revenue while analysing the conversion to organic farming.
There is quite some literature on inclusion of risk in agricultural farm models (Hardaker et al. 2004) . To incorporate risk in a mathematical programming model, two frequently used modelling practices can be taken into account. One is quadratic risk programming (QRP) and the other is utility-efficient programming (UEP) model. They both maximise expected income or utility of a risk averse decision maker subject to a set of resource and other constraints (Freund 1956; Lambert and McCarl 1985; Patten et al. 1988) . The advantage of QRP is that it requires only a vector of means and the variance-covariance matrix of the revenues per unit of possible cropping activities. However, the assumptions necessary to validate the use of QRP for farm planning under risk, which are that the farmer's utility function is quadratic or the distribution of total net revenue is normal (Hardaker et al. 2004) , are not necessarily met. In contrast, UEP, as a non-parametric method, uses the discrete empirical distribution, and includes the joint distribution of yield and prices by means of so-called 'states of nature' (specific combinations and probabilities of possible outcomes). In contrast to QRP, in UEP a number of types of utility function can be incorporated. Utility-efficient programming was applied by Flaten and Lien (2007) on organic dairy farms but the model was used to optimise decisions for only 1 year. Cocks (1968) and Rae (1971) were the first to introduce the dynamic aspect in risk programming for agriculture in the form of discrete stochastic programming. Any empirical multi-period UEP model analysis in agriculture we did not find in the literature. In this paper the previously developed dynamic linear programming (DLP) model (Acs et al. 2007a ) is extended with price and yield risk and a utility maximizing objective function (i.e. dynamic utility-efficient programming model, DUEP).
The objective of this paper is to describe the developed model and to apply it to the conversion process from conventional to organic farming, taking into account the risk of yield and price variation before, during and after the conversion years.
The paper starts with the description of the model. Here the inclusion of risk in the mathematical programming model, the general structure of the model, and the activities and constraints are described. Next, the data and the set up of the calculations are presented. Then, the results of the model for a basic situation are presented and analysed followed by a sensitivity analysis for different factors. The paper ends with a discussion on the method and the results obtained.
Method

Inclusion of risk in a mathematical programming model
In order to include risk in a mathematical programming model, two issues have to be taken into account: (i) the uncertainty of the risky events, which can occur in the future; (ii) the attitude of the farmer towards these risky events. The risk in the model is represented by the probabilities of occurrence of different events. Each event represents a state of nature. The attitude towards risk is expressed by an assumed utility function of the farmer.
The arable farmer has the choice to stay conventional, to convert part of the land or convert all the land to organic production. The conversion period takes 2 years. The farmer can also choose to convert the land at once or stepwise (converting in parts). In the model only one-way conversion is permitted. It is assumed that if once the farmer decides to convert (a certain area), no backward conversion can take place.
When assuming certainty, one average state can be included in the model, as was done in the previous DLP model (Acs et al. 2007a) . While including risky outcomes, more states should be taken into account. Each alternativeconventional, conversion and organic -has its own risk. In the DUEP model, the states of nature are represented by the revenues of crops for a number of individual years depending on crop yield and price for the particular year. Each of the alternative states of nature occurs with a certain probability.
Most people are risk averse when faced with significantly risky incomes or wealth outcomes (Hardaker et al. 2004) . A person who is risk averse is willing to forgo some expected income for a reduction in risk, the range of acceptable trade-off depending on how risk averse that individual is. This trade-off can be included by converting expected income to the utility of the individual, which means that the individuals' attitude towards risk has to be included. Conversion of income to utility is done by using a utility function.
In utility-efficient programming, any convenient form of utility function, with the exception of risk seeking functions, can be used to represent the farmers' preferences (Patten et al. 1988) . Preferences vary between farmers; therefore, different assumptions can be used on their risk attitude in the range from risk neutral to extremely risk averse. The assumption of risk aversion implies a concave utility function. In our analysis the common negative exponential function is used (Hardaker et al. 2004) : U = 1)exp )Ra*z , where U is the utility of a certain person, Ra is the absolute risk aversion coefficient of that particular person and z is discounted labour income over a period of 10 years. Concavity of this function is ensured, as, U¢(z)>0, and U¢¢(z)<0. This function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. This means that preferences between payoffs (labour income) are unchanged if a constant amount is added to or subtracted from all payoffs. Labour income, which is used in this paper as the income measure z, is defined as revenues minus all costs, excluding the costs of family labour. It is therefore the remuneration for labour and management of the farmer and his family.
According to Anderson and Dillon (1992) , the degree of risk aversion of any individual with respect to wealth (w) may be characterized in terms of the relative risk aversion coefficient. The coefficient of relative risk aversion can be calculated as Rr(w) = )wU¢¢(w)/U¢(w), where U¢¢(w) and U¢(w) represent the second and first derivatives, respectively, of the utility function of a person with respect to wealth (U(w)) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) . This means that the risk aversion is reflected by the curvature of the individual's utility function. The relative risk aversion can be grouped as follows (Anderson and Dillon 1992) :
Rr(w)= 0, risk neutral; Rr(w)= 0.5, hardly risk averse at all; Rr(w)= 1.0, somewhat risk averse (typical); Rr(w)= 2.0, rather risk averse; Rr(w)= 3.0, very risk averse; Rr(w)= 4.0, extremely risk averse. As the utility function used includes the absolute risk aversion coefficient Ra, a relationship is required between Ra(w) and Rr(w). Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) showed that Ra(w) = Rr(w)/w in which w is the wealth measure. In this paper the wealth measure w is measured at the initial wealth level (Gollier 2001) which is approximated by the farm equity.
General structure of the model
The general structure of the DUEP model is formulated as follows:
p S comb U S comb ðREV Sy ; C y ; RaÞ; Ra varied ð1Þ subject to:
x y P0 ð3Þ Table 1 gives an overview of all the variables and symbols used in the model. The expected utility of the farmer over the 10 year planning horizon is maximized, which is a function of different crop revenues (determined by the states of nature), their variable costs, fixed costs and the risk aversion coefficient of the farmer (Equation 1). The 10 year planning horizon is long enough not to influence the results of conversion -usually conversion is completed after 3-6 years (MacRae et al. 1990) . Maximization is subject to several activity constraints (Equations 2 and 3). The model each year chooses between the activities (x), which together with the states of nature will determine the final outcome.
Activities and constraints are included in each period (year) for all the relevant decisions and many of them are duplicated from 1 year to the next (e.g. annual crop activities). The link between the years is provided by the rotation requirements and the conversion of the land area (Equation 2a) and the objective function. For a more extensive description of the dynamic aspects of the model see Acs et al. (2007a) .
Following Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) the expected utility value is calculated from the utility values weighted by the corresponding probabilities (Equation 4). 
where
The utility values are calculated by transferring the discounted labour income into utility values using the negative exponential utility function:
The discounted labour income over 10 years per state (z Scomb ) is the sum over 10 years of the discounted gross margin per state of nature per year (GM Sy ) minus the discounted fixed costs (C Fy ) per year (costs of land, machinery and buildings). The discounted annual gross margin is calculated as follows:
where REV SLy is the revenue per state of nature per crop per year, C Ly is the variable costs per crop per year, LUS Ly is the land use system (cropping pattern) in hectare of each crop per year, L is the crop type and i is the discount rate (4 per cent). The choice of activities determines the revenues and the costs of farming. The revenues represent the discrete stochastic element in the model, which depends on the chosen crops and the states of nature of each crop. Variable costs include crop production costs (including costs of variable operations, pesticide use, energy use, contract work, marketing costs and other remaining costs), costs of purchased nutrients (manure and fertilisers), hired labour costs and nutrient taxes. The final production plan maximizes the probability-weighted average of the utilities of the discounted labour income of the cropping patterns over the 10 years. The matrix developed comprised 9845 activities and 11 031 constraints. The model was solved using GAMS programming language and SBB solver (Brooke et al. 1988 ).
Activities and constraints
The main groups of activities (x) in the model are:
1. Crop activities:
Conventional: winter wheat, spring barley, ware potatoes, seed potatoes, sugar beet, onion, and carrot;
Organic: winter wheat, spring barley, ware potatoes, seed potatoes, sugar beet, onion, carrot, spring wheat, kidney bean, green pea, alfalfa celeriac, grass-clover; Conversion: the same as organic crop activities with only difference that organic yields and conventional prices are used.
2. Hired labour. There is an opportunity to hire unlimited amount of skilled and unskilled labour at any time of the year for 18 Euro/h and 9 Euro/h, respectively (CAO 2002). 3. Manure and fertiliser purchase. 4. Activities for calculating nutrient surplus, organic matter input and pesticides use.
The main groups of constraints are:
1. Land availability. A 48 hectare farm size is assumed, which is an average farm size in the central clay region in the Netherlands. 2. Rotation restrictions. All the individual crops and groups of crops have their own rotation constraints which are mainly based on agronomic reasons. For conventional production 3 year crop rotation is used for the whole land area, which is characterising the region. For conversion and organic production 6 year crop rotation is used. This more diverse crop rotation is a requirement for organic farming. More detailed information concerning crop rotations can be found in Acs et al. (2007b) . 3. Conversion restrictions. Technical constraints concerning the dynamic aspect of the model. The first year the model is restricted to produce only in conventional way. This restriction was imposed in order to be able to compare the conventional production with the conversion and organic production plan. From the second year onwards the model can convert to organic production. In case land goes into conversion, it will be in conversion for 2 years to become organic land area. The model decides how much land goes from conventional into conversion. In the model the conversion is restricted to one-way direction, so the model excludes the possibility to convert back. 4. Household labour constraint. The available amount of family labour is assumed to be 1.1 full-time labour (2255 h/year), which is an average labour supply in this region for 48 ha land area (De Wolf & De Wolf, pers. comm., 2004) . Family labour supply per period is assumed to be constant over the year. 5. Nutrient balance calculation for Dutch Mineral Accounting System (MINAS) regulation. MINAS calculates a nutrient balance at farm level per hectare. Above the acceptable level (100 kg N and 25 kg P 2 O 5 per hectare in year 2002) the farmer has to pay a levy in Euro/kg of unacceptable surplus, which is 2.3 Euro/kg in the case of nitrogen and 9 Euro/kg in the case of phosphate (MANMF 2004). 6. Maximum manure input restriction for Manure Transfer Agreement System (MTAS) regulation. MTAS sets a limit to the amount of manure that can be used on the farm. This limit is based on nitrogen (N) content which is 170 kg N from manure per hectare.
Effect of yield and price risk on conversion7. Several counting rows for pesticides use and organic matter input to the farm.
Data
Regarding crop revenues, yearly average data for different crops were available from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) in the Netherlands (LEI, 2004) . FADN is a unique panel dataset, which includes crop-level information for a representative sample of farms. The number of conventional, conversion, and organic farms in the sample was 400, 80, and 32 respectively. As farm level data were not available, the data used in this paper consists of average yields and product prices per crop per year. For conventional crops data were available from 10 years, for conversion crops data were available from only 2 years, and for organic crops data were available from 3 years. Because prices and yields tend to change over time in a more or less consistent and predictable way, they were de-trended to account for inflation and technical progress (Barry et al. 2000) , with 2002 as the base year. Prices were corrected for inflation by using the inflation index of prices (CBS 2005) . Crop yields were corrected for technical progress by regressing yield on time as an explanatory variable. Consequently, inflation and technical progress are absent in modelling.
To avoid shock effects because of lumpiness of data, the corrected data on conventional and organic crops were transformed into 15 states of nature by using the procedure for simulating multivariate empirical probability distributions described by Richardson et al. (2000) . This procedure takes into account stochastic correlation between crops and produces a smoother distribution of states of nature given the probability distributions encapsulated in the original data. Serial correlation was not taken into account as this correlation appeared to be very low (R 2 <0.25). Latin Hypercube sampling was used to simulate 15 states of nature, which are considered enough to get reliable results (Lien et al. 2009 ). The resulting 15 states of nature for conventional and organic farming are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . For conversion crops it was judged that simulation of 15 states was not justified given that there are only 2 years of data. Data from these 2 years were used as two states of nature (see Table 4 ). Within each stage of cropping (conventional, conversion, and organic) each state has the same probability to occur: p sc = 0.06667 for conventional, p st = 0.5 for conversion and p so = 0.06667 for organic states of nature. Based on this, the joint probability (p Scomb ) for all combinations of states of nature is 0.02222 (p s = p sc · p st · p so ), which all together sum up to one.
Regarding variable costs of crops, data was obtained from Quantitative Information Handbook (KWIN 2002) . Fixed costs for conventional and organic farms were calculated from the results of real farms (Wijnands and Dekking 2002) . The direct costs (variable costs without nutrient and labour costs) and the labour and nutrient requirement per crop are summarized in Table 5 . Detailed information about these input data and about fixed costs, crop rotation, household labour use and organic matter input can be found in Acs et al. (2007a,b) .
For the calculation of the absolute risk aversion coefficient (Ra) with respect to wealth, by means of formula: Ra(w) = Rr(w)/w, an assumption on wealth should be made. For this the average owners equity was used of the same farms from which the yields and product prices were taken. The average ownership equity amounted to 835 000 Euro (LEI, 2004) . As shown before the relative risk aversion coefficient (Rr) can take the range between 0 and 4. This means that the corresponding absolute risk aversion coefficient can take values between 0 and 0.0000048.
Results
Basic results of DUEP model
The results in Table 6 show the expected discounted labour income with the accompanying standard deviation and certainty equivalent, the area converted to organic farming and the optimal cropping plan across different risk aversion coefficients. The degree of risk aversion has a strong effect on the optimal decision of a farmer to convert. While it is optimal for the risk neutral farmer to convert the whole area to organic production, for a farmer with a relative risk aversion ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 it is optimal to convert only part of the area. In the case the farmer is even more risk averse (3.0 £ Rr £ 4.0) conversion is not optimal. Up to a relative risk aversion of 1.0 the type of crops included in the conventional and organic cropping plan remain the same. The only change is that the area of organic farming decreases. When going from somewhat risk averse to rather risk averse, the organic area increases, which might seem contrary to what would be expected. However, the replacement of the risky organic crop seed onion by organic sugar beet (see Table 3 for revenues and SD of revenues of organic crops) makes organic farming as a whole less risky, causing the increase of the organic area. At high risk aversion (3.0 ‡ Rr ‡ 4.0) organic farming is not interesting. Moreover, less risky conventional crops like seed potato and sugar beet take the place of more risky crops like ware potato, seed onion and carrot (see Table 2 for revenues and SD of revenues of conventional crops).
Sensitivity analysis
The basic outcome of the DUEP model shows that partial conversion takes place when relative risk aversion ranges between 0.5 and 2.0 while no conversion takes place when relative risk aversion is 3.0 or higher. In the sensitivity analysis, different policy incentives (i.e. taxes on pesticides and subsidies for organic production), the effect of market stabilization, and the effect of learning are examined for a somewhat risk averse (Rr = 1) and a extremely risk averse farmer (Rr = 4.0). 
Taxes on pesticides
The first policy incentive to convert is a tax on pesticides. Pesticides are used only for conventional crops, as the use of synthetic chemical inputs in organic farming is not allowed. This gives an option to impose a tax on pesticide use in order to stimulate the farmers to convert to organic production. The amount of pesticides used for each crop activity is fixed in the model (i.e. it does not allow to use less pesticide which could have an affect on the output results). Pesticides use is measured in active ingredient (a.i.), which is the weight of the toxic substance in the applied product in kilograms. In this analysis the minimum amount of tax (in Euro/kg a.i.) necessary for conversion is determined. The sensitivity analysis shows that, taking into account a somewhat risk averse farmer, a tax of at least 13 Euro/kg active ingredient would cause the farm to fully convert (Table 7) . The area converted increases by raising taxes up to 13 Euro as this leads to higher costs of farming conventionally. Besides, by raising taxes crops requiring more pesticide are being replaced by crops requiring lower amount of pesticide (i.e. winter wheat is replaced by spring barley, seed potato by ware potato). For a very risk averse farmer full conversion would take place if taxes exceed 35 Euro/kg a.i.
Subsidies for organic production
Another option to stimulate conversion to organic farming is using subsidies on organic production. Subsidies can take different forms: (i) subsidy at once, at the beginning of the conversion period; (ii) conversion subsidies, given during the conversion period which would serve as a compensation for switching costs (i.e. costs of investment/disinvestment, learning costs, lower revenues during this period); (iii) subsidies for all organically produced crops starting from conversion years. All of these are hectare-based subsidies for the area converted. The minimum amount of subsidy required to convert is determined by the DUEP-model. Model calculations show that for a somewhat risk averse farmer at least 148 Euro/ha subsidy would be required for every year of organic farming, starting from conversion, to make the farm fully organic. For extremely risk averse farmer a 221 Euro/ha subsidy would be needed for partial conversion and 441 Euro/ha for full conversion (Table 7) . Partial conversion enables the farmer to keep one part of the area with more stable income originating from conventional production while with the other part the riskier organic production would be compensated by the provided subsidies.
In the case if the subsidy would be given at once, at the beginning of the conversion period then somewhat risk averse farmer would need to be paid 1144 Euro/ha/year for full conversion, and extremely risk averse farmer would require 1708 Euro/ha/year for partial and 3410 Euro/ha/year for full conversion. If the subsidy were given during the 2 year conversion period then for somewhat risk averse farmer 584 Euro/ha/year and for extremely risk averse 872 Euro/ha/year (1739 Euro/ha/year for full conversion) would be required, given the 10 year planning horizon.
Market stabilization
In this analysis, we explore how the conversion would take place if the market for organic products were more stable, meaning less variability in organic revenues. The decrease of the organic revenue SD at which it is optimal to convert is determined. This is done by redefining the values in Table 3 (same average, decreased SD) and doing model calculations based on the redefined data. By trial and error the required decrease of SD was determined. Table 7 shows that the SD of organic revenues has to be reduced by at least 22 per cent of the current SD before the somewhat risk averse farmer would convert fully to organic production. For an extremely risk averse farmer a reduction of SD by 30 per cent would be required to make the farm convert partly while 35 per cent reduction would lead to full conversion.
Learning effect
During the conversion years, the farmer has to learn organic production practices. After a few years of experience, the organic crops might give higher and more stable yield and thus more stable revenues. In this scenario, this effect is investigated by raising the mean and decreasing the SD of organic crop revenues from the fourth year onwards. The mean is assumed to rise by 5 per cent and stay at this higher level the following years, and the percentage reduction in SD that is necessary for conversion is determined.
The results in Table 7 show that assuming 5 per cent rise in organic crop revenues from the fourth year would in itself cause the somewhat risk averse farmer to fully convert. For an extremely risk averse farmer, next to the rise in organic crop revenues the SD of it should be 9 per cent lower than the original SD in order to make the farm convert partly (23 per cent lower for full conversion).
Discussion and conclusion
The developed method is suitable to model the conversion from conventional to organic farming including future yield and price risk of conventional and organic crops. The dynamic aspect and the inclusion of stochastic elements into the model is one of the advantages of this modelling approach. This makes farm level analysis of conversion closer to the real situation compared with static and deterministic models. The model can also be used as a tool for policy makers to analyse the effect of certain incentives at farm level conversion. However, the model strongly depends on the data available for use.
In this research, survey data were used for assessing risks. For conversion and organic crop yields and prices there were only 2 and 3 year data observations available, respectively. This questions the reliability of the model results. Especially for established organic systems data availability is improving by collection and publication of data from organic farms (FADN data collected by LEI), and from BIOM-projects (Organic Farming: Innovation and Conversion). However, more observations are needed also from in-conversion farms in order to get more realistic model results. The low data-availability prompts for reserve regarding the validity of the conclusion.
The survey data used in this article concerning yield risk and also other evidence (Morris et al. 2001; Van Bueren et al. 2002) showed that in organic farming the variability of crop yields is higher compared to conventional farming. However, the conclusion that organic yields fluctuate more than in conventional systems is not a 'fact', there is also evidence in the opposite direction (Lampkin and Padel 1994) . In the case organic farming would have more stable yields, compared to conventional farming, a risk averse farmer would convert 'more easily' to organic production given its higher expected revenues.
Calculations with the DLP model developed by Acs et al. (2007a) showed that one-step conversion of the whole farm area would maximize net present value in 10 years. This result is valid in the case when there is no risk aversion. When including a typical risk aversion level of one in the DUEP model only partial conversion takes place. At a risk aversion level of 3.0 or higher conversion does not take place at all. Moreover, in that case the optimal (conventional) production plan of the farm is affected. Other studies on inclusion of risk aversion into mathematical modelling showed that the cost of ignoring risk aversion may be small in short-run (tactical and operational) decision problems in farming (Pannell et al. 2000; Lien and Hardaker 2001; Flaten and Lien 2007) . Our results suggest that in considering risk aversion in the decision problems with a longer planning horizon (strategic decisions for several years) the effect of risk aversion can be considerable.
Sensitivity analysis showed that policy incentives such as taxes and subsidies and output price and yield stabilization stimulate the conversion to organic farming. The model results show that for a somewhat (i.e. typical) risk averse farmer in the case of a 13 Euro tax on pesticides it would be optimal to convert the whole area to organic farming (35 Euro tax for an extremely risk averse farmer). A tax of 13 Euro and a Rr of 1.0 would mean that in the first conventional year 10 993 Euro tax has to be paid while this amount would be 25 297 Euro if tax per kg a.i. would be 35 Euro and Rr would be 4.0.
In case subsidies are implied, the model results show that subsidies required for full conversion of arable farms (Rr = 1.0) is almost equal to the actual subsidies paid to farmers between 2000 and 2003 in the Netherlands. The initial conversion subsidy was 1136 Euro/ha (MINLNV, 2000) while the minimum required amount calculated by the model for a somewhat risk averse farmer is 1144 Euro/ha/year. This means that the governmental subsidy level should be higher to persuade somewhat risk averse farmers to fully convert their farm, especially if any non-economic reluctance to change would need to be overcome. For extremely risk averse farmers the required subsidy should be more than three times as high as was paid in reality.
Analysis of the impact of a more stabilised market for organic products and on the learning effect showed that the variation of expected revenue of organic products must be considerably lower than the observed variation. Prices of organic crops might have great variability also in the future, due to the small-scale, immature nature of the organic market (easy substitutability of organic products with the conventional ones) and the lack of government intervention to stabilise prices (Lampkin and Padel 1994) . Yields are also subject to weather and other agronomic factors, which mean that the yields stay rather volatile also in the future. This suggests that policy incentives, such as taxes or subsidies, will also in the future be needed to stimulate conversion.
This study provides valuable insight into the farm-specific decision as to whether or not to convert to organic farming. The results show that for a risk-neutral farmer it is optimal to convert to organic farming; however, for a risk-averse farmer it is only optimal to fully convert if policy incentives are applied such as taxes on pesticides or subsidies on conversion, or if the market for the organic products becomes more stable. The more risk averse a farmer is the more incentive is needed to make a farmer convert to organic farming. Although this seems obvious, risk aversion of farmers is often ignored. This model provides the basis to determine such incentives.
